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5 Beyond Conflict and Coexistence?
The decades-old Saudi–Iranian rivalry has been once again thrust into the spotlight with 
political and social upheaval spreading in both countries and the wider region. With each 
government facing domestic pressure – be it from religious hardliners or civil society 
activists – their hostile stance vis-à-vis their regional rival may partially be explained by an 
attempt to rally a fractious country against a national foe. Both remain deeply involved in 
conflicts outside their borders, each funding proxies and political movements in a bid for 
influence and regional hegemony. Further afield, global powers including the US, Russia 
and the EU are important actors and participants in the rivalry, lending support to either 
side and responding to developments as they occur.
The conflict has often been explained as a function of an allegedly eternal Sunni–Shiʿa schism 
that mutates into tense proxy wars, sponsored by both countries across the Middle East and 
beyond. In the hopes of deconstructing this simple and reductionist analytical framework, 
the LSE Middle East Centre convened a workshop on 8 May 2018, bringing together Saudi 
and Iranian political, economic and social analysts with other Iran- and Saudi Arabia-watch-
ers. The workshop examined the major dynamics that shape the ongoing rivalry between 
these regional heavyweights, and the report that follows is a summary of the proceedings 
of the day’s three sessions. The first featured speakers from each country examining the 
domestic-level concerns, including societal and elite perceptions of the Saudi/Iranian threat. 
The second focused on how the rivalry has spilled over and played out in various proxy 
conflicts in the region. The third looked at how international reactions have moulded and, 
in some cases, exacerbated the division. The workshop was held on the day US President 
Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with the 
speed of events serving to underline the need for the expert analysis included herein.
Saudi–Iranian Rivalry: The Domestic Level
The View from Saudi Arabia
For conflicts as persistent as that being discussed, competing historical narratives are con-
structed and advanced by the warring parties. Since 1979, the Saudi narrative has focused 
on a specific understanding of Iranian ambitions in the region. The Saudi perspective is 
that they are engaged in a defence of the status quo against a revolutionary, militaristic 
and expansionist Shiʿa theocracy. In this reading, Saudi Arabia is content to maintain the 
current regional order, whereas Iran is in its ‘Trotskyist’ stage, seeking to export revolution. 
Iranian ambitions do, however, precede the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as Henry Kissinger 
had discussed with Shah Reza Pahlavi (documented in Andrew Scott Cooper’s book The 
Oil Kings) the possibility of the then-key American ally and pre-eminent regional military 
power taking over Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields.
The Iranian regime is animated both by this historical memory and a deep enmity 
towards Saudi Wahhabism. Saudi elites consider Iran an existential threat, as its imperial 
ambitions involve overturning the ruling order in the Gulf. Thus, Saudi Crown Prince 
Muhammad bin Salman’s current manoeuvres are to counteract what he sees as a threat 
that long predates him. Though academics and journalists tend to consider Saudi Arabia 
6 Saudi Arabia and Iran
paranoid, Saudi policymakers argue that interventions like that in Yemen are logical, 
with the Kingdom seeing Iran using the militarily capable Houthi movement to attempt 
to build a bridgehead in north Yemen and replicate the Hezbollah model on Saudi Ara-
bia’s border.
Iran is economically stressed and yet is allocating a disproportionate amount of its reserves 
to support power projection from Lebanon to Yemen. In doing so, it has proven adept at 
exploiting fault lines between and within Arab countries. The ‘status quo’ powers of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – headed by Saudi Arabia – have sought to respond 
using increasingly assertive measures. In recent years however, we have seen a schism in 
the Gulf with regard to Iran, as Oman, Kuwait and – especially since June 2017 – Qatar 
have struck a more reconciliatory tone. With the American public no longer willing to 
countenance long-term overseas military deployments, Saudi Arabia has reacted to the 
withdrawal of the ‘Pax Americana’ security umbrella by devoting more resources to its 
own military capabilities. The Saudis have declared that there will be no change in their 
current posture unless Iran ceases trying to destabilise the region, which the current Saudi 
leadership thinks may only happen with regime change.
The View from Iran
In the Iranian narrative, their country is considered an ancient regional power, historically 
dominant and impelled to remain so. Governments post-1979 have simply been opera-
tors – rather than shapers – of Iran’s foreign policy in this regard. Iran engages in power 
politics like any other state, the difference being that the state in Iran (since 1979) is unin-
terested in being a member of the international community. Though it desires economic 
interaction and integration into international trade flows, it draws a distinction between 
such conduct and political dealings; a reflection of the ruling political Islamist ideology. 
Neither is it interested in sharing intelligence or capabilities on matters of national secu-
rity with other countries in the region.
Since its inception in 1932, Saudi Arabia has sought to participate in alliances and coalitions 
to magnify its regional clout. The Middle East is today similar to eighteenth-century Europe 
in that there is a surplus of heavyweight rivals (Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran), each 
aspiring to be the dominant power. Only 6 percent of trade is conducted within the region, 
guaranteeing perpetual conflict as history teaches that peace relies upon economic interde-
pendency. Iran, seeing this, may seek in the coming decades to ‘exit’ the Middle East and 
return to its natural tendency toward looking beyond the region for economic development.
Iran’s seemingly dogmatic foreign policy is not born of a desire for isolation or an inflexible 
ideology, but is due to the constitutional division between the state and the government. 
The former – the institutions under direct supervision of the Supreme Leader – shapes 
the general framework of foreign and domestic policy, whereas the elected government 
is merely in charge of implementing these policies. The current government wants to 
open up to the international community, but the state wants to maintain the order it has 
created. Iranian foreign policy is in turn a reflection of domestic politics; only a change 
in the latter (where soft issues like the environment, education and the inflation rate can 
pressure the state) will lead to a new direction in the former.
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Regional Unfolding of the Rivalry 
Yemen
The commonly-held perception – particularly widespread in Saudi Arabia – of Yemen’s 
Houthis as Iranian proxies is a gross oversimplification. Yemen has a history of shifting 
alliances amid interference from outside actors, with relations between Iran and various 
Yemeni groups no exception. Relations between South Yemen (the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen or PDRY) and Iran changed entirely after the 1979 Iranian Revolu-
tion, as they had been on very poor terms with the Shah, later becoming cordial with the 
Islamic Republic. North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic or YAR) had very bad relations 
with Iran as Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was firmly on the side of Iraq during the 
Iran–Iraq War. Then-Iranian President Khatami met Saleh – by this point, President of a 
unified Yemen – in 2003, and managed to reach an accord, which later deteriorated after 
the beginning of the Houthi insurgency in 2004. Saleh then invested heavily in portraying 
Iran as behind the Houthi movement, a narrative that convinced neither the US nor Saudi 
Arabia at the time.
The conflict in Yemen has never been fought along a clear-cut sectarian axis. Saudi Arabia 
has supported a variety of groups there, including the Zaidi/Shiʿa Imamate of North Yemen 
in the 1962–70 civil war, and subsequently both tribal groups and the state in order to 
keep Yemen neither too weak nor too strong to pose a threat. Saudi Arabia even implied 
it would recognise South Yemen’s secession, but relented in exchange for permanent 
recognition of Saudi ownership of disputed borderland territories after 2000. The most 
recent Saudi adventure in Yemen, launched by newly-appointed Defence Minister Prince 
Muhammad bin Salman in 2015, was justified as a mission to restore Yemen’s legitimate 
government. It functioned, however, as a mechanism to strengthen his internal position, 
bin Salman thinking the Houthis would not last longer than a few weeks against the well-
equipped Saudi military. Three years later this has clearly not worked out as planned, 
with the highly-advanced state having completely failed to defeat a poorly-equipped 
insurgency. A UN Panel of Experts declared they had no definitive proof that Iran had 
been providing the Houthis with material support. The Houthis have in any case proven 
that they are no-one’s proxy, having often opposed Iranian diktats, for example moving 
into Aden against Iranian advice. The Saudi/UAE blockade, instead of preventing military 
aid from reaching the insurgency, has created a humanitarian crisis. Saudi policy seems 
unlikely to change as the new Crown Prince brooks no dissent, whereas some debate is 
permitted in Iran, which may yet affect policy.
Iraq
In Iraq, it is easy to overstate Iranian influence, even after the obvious increase in direct 
intervention since 2014. Iraq remains an extremely weak state, its structural problems 
stemming from the destabilisation caused by the 2003 US invasion. Though Iran has much 
more soft power in Iraq than Saudi Arabia, and has benefitted from the US warning the 
Gulf powers to keep out of Iraq until their withdrawal in 2011, the situation has changed 
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since then. For decades before that, Iran had successfully invested in Iraqi opposition 
forces, with Saudi Arabia considering 2003 a catastrophe which realigned the regional 
order and rendered Iran the dominant decision-maker in Baghdad.
However, around 2010, Ammar al-Hakim’s Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (a powerful 
Shiʿa political party) grew more autonomous and refused to do Iran’s bidding, as did the 
Sadrist movement. To Iran’s chagrin, there was furthermore an attempt to reassert Najaf 
as the centre of the Shiʿa world. Iran, as with most neighbouring powers, has an interest 
in Iraq not becoming a coherent autonomous polity, but despite the commander of Iran’s 
special forces Qassem Soleimani’s reputation as a strategic genius, they have blundered in 
pursuit of this objective. It was Iranian ally and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Ma-
liki’s policies of oversectarianism that caused the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) and the fall 
of Mosul. Iran’s Shiʿa rivals on the domestic Iraqi scene now look set to benefit, as evi-
denced by Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoun Coalition’s unexpectedly strong showing in the 
May 2018 parliamentary elections.
Saudi Arabia has had fewer avenues for influence in Iraq. During the 2005 elections, a 
lot of Saudi money went into supporting the Iraqi Accord Front (Tawafuq), a primarily 
Arab and Sunni political grouping, to little effect. Subsequently, the Saudis funded Iyad 
Allawi’s electoral vehicles, successfully in 2010 but not since. They have not managed to 
sustainably fund winners, and have now resolved to back the centrists (i.e. current Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi), hoping that funding statebuilding on his terms may lead to 
border security. Whether Abadi manages to stay in power after a relatively poor showing 
in the elections remains to be seen.
Lebanon
Lebanon’s military, economic and cultural arenas are each sites of contestation for the 
competing powers, though methods of asserting influence vary. The country is central to 
Iranian political and strategic goals, and there has been strong Iranian support for Hez-
bollah since its inception in 1982. The Lebanese confessionalist system has entrenched 
sectarian networks and identity blocs, which Saudi Arabia navigates through, inter alia, 
funding infrastructure projects in Beirut, donating towards reconstruction after the 2006 
war with Israel, and providing support for a range of different Salafi groups across Lebanon. 
Architectural space in Beirut is dominated by Saudi-sponsored endeavours, while Iranian 
investment is much smaller and focused in poorer southern suburbs of Beirut. 
In both cases domestic realities shape how this bid for influence plays out, as invest-
ment is typically funnelled through community figures with identity playing an important 
role. Security is another contested site, with, for example, any variances in levels of Saudi 
support for the army or Iranian funding for Hezbollah threatening to drastically change 
the security landscape.
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Bahrain
Bahrain is geographically positioned between the two hegemons and is often seen as the 
epicentre of sectarian and geopolitical competition. After many years of authoritarian rule, 
the fear among Arab monarchies of further spread of the 2011 uprisings allowed the ruling 
Al Khalifa family to frame protests along sectarian lines, imbuing sectarian difference with 
political and security meaning. The securitisation of sectarian difference sought to ensure 
the regime’s survival by maintaining the support of Sunni communities in Bahrain, along-
side the continued support of Saudi Arabia. The uprisings were quickly framed as the 
consequence of nefarious Iranian involvement in Bahrain’s sovereign affairs, and the pri-
marily Shiʿa protest movement has since been painted as an Iranian fifth column, despite 
a well-regarded UN Commission of Inquiry finding no evidence of Iranian involvement in 
the demonstrations.
Iran has previously claimed Bahrain as a historic province, which has naturally caused 
concern for Saudi Arabia due to the country’s proximity, oil wealth and security impli-
cations. As such, in response to the 2011 unrest, Saudi-led troops of the GCC Peninsula 
Shield Force crossed into Bahrain over the King Fahd Causeway, itself designed and built 
to prevent Iranian expansionism after the Revolution.
Syria
In Syria, the increasing length and brutality of the civil war is a result of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia (and others) instrumentalising the conflict. However, the Saudi–Iran rivalry has 
not been the defining feature of the Syrian war. Rather than a country of unique concern 
for either of the regional hegemons, Syria emerged as merely a central theatre in the battle 
for control of the broader regional order.
Saudi Arabia took the opportunity to try to reverse the post-2003 order and assert itself 
more strongly in Syria and Lebanon. The Kingdom wanted to weaken Iran through Syria, 
but there was also a strong intra-Sunni rift, with Qatar supporting Muslim Brother-
hood-aligned groups, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE diverting funds to rival opposition 
formations. The Saudi objective in Syria was to spur a full US intervention and so they 
constantly tried to keep the Americans on board.
Iran saw the 2011 uprising against their ally as an existential threat, though rather than 
treating Saudi Arabia as their primary adversary, they instead focused on the US and Israel, 
who they believed to be using the Kingdom as a tool. Iran reasoned that an uprising sup-
ported by Gulf powers was a precursor to regime change in Iran itself. The government 
felt particularly precarious so soon after the 2009 Green Movement and before the 2015 
JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal, would lead to the lifting of sanctions.
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The key regional conflict in Syria is now between Iran and Israel, not Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
as the latter has withdrawn to focus elsewhere. This is due to a commitment gap between 
the two: Iran is fully invested in the battle, with the elite Quds force and Hezbollah on the 
ground incurring many casualties, and the Iranians effectively creating non-state actors to 
buttress Assad. The Saudis, soon realising sufficient American support was not forthcoming, 
calculated that the cost for further involvement would be too high for any potential gain.
Today, Assad wishes to once again have control over his state and is not happy with how 
strong and entrenched the Iranians are. The Saudis, having withdrawn, now think Assad 
may actually offer the best possible chance for diminishing Iranian influence.
International Responses to the Rivalry
Europe
Europe has recently played a secondary role in regional developments despite having 
much at stake in the Middle East, its interests including security, economic links, ener-
gy-related concerns and the desire to prevent nuclear proliferation. In Europe’s relative 
absence, others have taken the lead. The Iran-led regional bloc has been empowered due 
to support from Russia, and events in Syria have now starkly clarified the regional divid-
ing lines. Much of Muhammad bin Salman’s bellicosity is a result of uncritical American 
backing since President Trump’s election. Europe is well-resourced, economically compa-
rable with the US and militarily comparable to Russia. However, the main reason Europe is 
a secondary player is due to a lack of political cohesion. The so-called E3 (France, the UK 
and Germany) were the main drivers of what became the JCPOA, having laid the ground-
work for the final treaty. 
Given the pursuit of the JCPOA provided Europe some political leverage in Iran and the 
wider region, defending the agreement – after the American violation of its terms – is 
Europe’s prime interest. Whether the deal can be saved remains to be seen: some in 
Europe (particularly France and Britain) have tended towards the strategy of mollifying 
Trump, though this has proven to be ineffective and even counterproductive. Many of 
those involved in crafting the agreement recognise that it is not simply a key non-pro-
liferation agreement, but a political platform on which the EU could build a working 
relationship with Iran.
This goes hand in hand with recognising that regional instability is not solely the result of 
Iranian interference beyond its borders, as Israel and Saudi Arabia also bear much respon-
sibility in this respect. A dialogue over Yemen has recently been launched between the E3/
EU and Iran, which may serve as a platform for further cooperation. Any robust security 
governance system would naturally have to be based on Saudi–Iranian coexistence.
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United States
The US under Trump views all engagement in the region through an anti-Iran prism, with 
Trump’s decision to renege on the JCPOA very much in keeping with such an approach. 
This has been driven by Obama’s legacy and Trump’s desire to undo it, with the US now 
fully embracing Saudi Arabia and Israel in their counter-Iran push. Comparing the policy 
decisions of each president, it is clear that Obama had an uncertain approach to the 
upheavals of 2011 and was seen as soft on Iran, whereas Trump has opted for embarking 
wholeheartedly upon a set of alliances without a coherent plan.
Criticism of Obama focused on his supposed singlemindedness regarding Iran, but he rea-
soned that the dramatic slowing of Iranian nuclear capabilities would require a drawback 
of focus on other factors, including Iran’s activities beyond its borders. The deal was not 
negotiated in a vacuum, but while the region was in crisis on multiple fronts. US policy in 
2011 unnerved the Saudis, who worried about the possible fall of the Bahraini monarchy 
and accused the US of being insufficiently supportive of its regional allies. As Obama left 
office, his parting words – urging the rival blocs to ‘share the neighbourhood’ and making 
oblique references to the Gulf potentates as ‘free riders’ – gave the impression that the US 
had abandoned its traditional partners.
Trump’s embrace of Saudi Arabia’s impetuous new ruler is driven by developments on the 
ground that have given the opportunity for a return to normalcy in their relations. Quite 
early on, the US gave up on the idea of regime change in Syria and Egypt, where they made 
their peace with President Sisi’s post-coup government. The US has also exerted little 
pressure upon Riyadh to scale back its military action in Yemen.
The debate on differences between Trump and Obama illustrates a fundamental point: 
the US is in retreat in the region. The post-9/11 mindset prioritises counterterrorism and 
homeland security – this dominant force guiding US decision-making drove the anti-ISIS 
efforts. Trump does not want to be entangled in the region any more than Obama did, 
and the former’s airstrikes in Syria were not followed by a change in stated policy on a US 
troop withdrawal. The US has very few tools beyond sanctions to effect a rollback of Iran 
and so this is left to regional actors.
Russia 
Russia’s approach under Putin has been to never side with third parties against each 
other, nor to remain neutral. The doctrine is instead to cooperate with both sides so as 
to incentivise each to give Russia reason to support them, with this playing out again in 
the Saudi–Iranian rivalry. Russia does value relations with both and wishes for this to 
continue. A common anti-Western line has, for now, united Russia and Iran, in addition 
to a pronounced alarm at the Sunni militant trend. Since the 1980s and its war against a 
transnational mujahideen in Afghanistan, Russia has looked at Saudi Arabia much as the 
US looks at Iran, not as a conservative autocracy but as an exporter of terrorism. Based on 
this premise, Russian and Iranian interests align most closely in Syria.
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However, Russia is also keen on improved ties with Saudi Arabia, encouraged that an 
important US ally is willing to cooperate with them. The fear of Saudi Arabia has led 
Moscow to cooperate and appease it, while also supporting Riyadh’s regional adversaries 
to keep them in check. There has been decades-long cooperation on oil, with the 2016 
cutback on oil prices a Russian concession to Saudi Arabia in the face of a common threat 
from American shale oil. Saudi Arabia did view Russia as commercially-motivated and 
supposed that they could supplant Iran once Tehran was seen to have outlived its useful-
ness. Bin Salman has now understood that this approach does not work with Putin and has 
since announced that Saudi Arabia will buy weapons from Russia (including the advanced 
S-400 missile defence system, Russia having only sold Iran the older S-300 model) even if 
they continue to do business with Iran.
A complicating factor is that – in addition to Russia, Saudi and Iran – there are also ‘fourth 
parties’ involved, such as Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. Russia is opposed to Saudi Arabia in 
Syria, but Putin has been very supportive of the Bahraini monarchy, which is an attempt 
to show the West that this – shoring up an autocratic, but reliable, ally facing a domestic 
threat – is an appropriate approach. In Yemen, Russia deals with the internationally-rec-
ognised Hadi government, which places them squarely in the Saudi–UAE camp, but the 
Houthis also travel to Moscow for talks. Putin’s even-handed approach does not imply his 
ability to solve a conflict, but Moscow is not interested in this. Their definition of peace in 
Syria, for example, implies international actors working together to fund reconstruction, 
as Russia does not have the resources to do so. Russia is now very close with Israel and 
Iran, but in balancing these foes Putin may unintentionally provoke conflict, the last thing 
he wants.
Conclusion
The Saudi–Iran rivalry is characterised by competing legitimacies. Each is Islamist in 
devising its political purpose, both having used that to oppose rival ideologies. Both 
sides wish – against the backdrop of what looks like a wider secular shift of global 
power – to shape a regional order that will promote their interests and guarantee their 
domestic security at a moment when they probably only have enough power to procure 
disorder. There is no natural balance of power in the Middle East, and there will not be a 
spontaneously generated grand accord or a Pax Russica. In the end, the problems of the 
region can only be addressed by fully functioning and resilient states under the cover of 
a collective security regime.
Neither Saudi Arabia or Iran has the power to truly marginalise or defeat the other, 
but though each face political and economic difficulties, they are sufficiently well-
equipped to perpetuate this rivalry through diplomatic, economic and even military 
means. The future of the Middle East is held hostage to this persistent conflict. It would 
be a mistake, however, to see the division as ancient, rooted in sectarian hatreds or 
even irresolvable. It remains unclear at this juncture how far we are from a détente or a 
resolution, and indeed we instead seem further from reconciliation between these two 
dominant powers than ever before.
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